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Abstract
Currently, many organizations open parts of their information systems (IS) via the Internet to the
public in order to co-create value with from end-consumer contributions. Yet, these practices of
openness are still to be integrated into the existing strategic management theory (Chesbrough
and Appleyard, 2007). We use a resource-based perspective to develop a framework for the
analysis configurations of different types of “openness” in order to move towards such an
integration. We consider two dimensions of openness of resources (access and control) as well as
different types of relations between resources (complementarity and specifity). Furthermore, we
analyze two mobile ecosystems on multiple levels to show the applicability of the framework. The
paper contributes to the further development of the resource-based theory and it provides a tool
for the analysis of cases of openness of resources. Additionally, the paper provides a novel
perspective and of the structure of mobile ecosystems.
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Resource-based theory, relational view, dynamic capabilities, network effects, mobile platforms,
mobile ecosystems.
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INTRODUCTION
In today's networked economies, value is often created by a compound network of
contributors that offer integrated services and products. For example, in the mobile industry we
discern the formation of business ecosystems that are centered around central nods (Basole,
2009a, Basole, 2009b). A firms in the central position of such an ecosystem can be described as
the platform leader (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) or the ecosystem orchestrator (Hinterhuber,
2002). The platform leader will strive to “orchestrate” the ecosystem in ways that improve its
overall value creation. The importance of ecosystems especially in the information and
communication technology (ICT) industries is widely acknowledged. However, the economical
mechanisms at work in ecosystems are not fully understood. Thus, ecosystems are currently of
high research interest (e.g. Adomavicius et al., 2007, Adomavicius et al., 2008a, Adomavicius et
al., 2008b).
We would like to contribute to the ongoing academic discussion by providing a novel
analysis on the orchestration of ecosystems. In particular, we develop and apply a framework for
the analysis of resource configurations on the interlinked levels of ecosystems. The framework
combines constructs of the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1986b, Barney, 1986c,
Wernerfelt, 1984) and the network effect theory (Farrell and Saloner, 1986, Katz and Shapiro,
1985, Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
We apply the framework to two cases from the mobile industry. First, we use it to analyze
NTT DoCoMo’s i-mode ecosystem as the first fully integrated mobile service offering (Ratliff,
2002). Second, we apply the framework to the ecosystem around Apple’s iPhone as one of the
more recently formed mobile smart phone ecosystems. Case analysis offers new insights and can
1
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provide more detailed explanations than other research methods (Eisenhardt, 1989, Glaser and
Strauss, 1967, Yin, 2003). Comparing cases has proven to be helpful especially in organizational
contexts (Parkhe, 1993, Van de Ven and Poole, 1990), e.g. to illustrate similar patterns (Yin,
2003).
We have two aims for this paper. First, the paper contributes to the further development of
resource-based theory. We develop a framework that considers “open resources” in order to
enhance the resource-based perspective. The framework provides a tool for the analysis of cases
of open resources (we discuss in the definition of openness below). Second, the paper shows the
applicability of the resource-based framework by using it to analyze two cases, i.e. mobile
ecosystems (NTT DoCoMo and Apple). Thereby, we strive to provide a novel perspective of the
structure of mobile ecosystems and improve the understanding of the successful orchestration of
mobile ecosystems.
We follow the recommended sequence of constructivist papers (Hevner et al., 2004,
Peffers et al., 2007) by organizing the paper into the three major parts problem definition, artifact
specification, and artifact application. First, we distinguish the terms “platform” and “ecosystem”
and develop a model of mobile ecosystems. Second, we discuss the network effects theory and
the resource-based theories. Third, we use the constructs of these theories to define a resourcebased framework of openness and closedness. Fourth, we apply the developed framework on the
introduced mobile ecosystems. Fifth and finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of the
applicability of the resource-based framework on other cases and industries, and its theoretical
contribution to an open resource-based view.
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PLATFORMS AND ECOSYSTEMS
The terms “platform” and “ecosystem” are often found in recent literature. However, their
use is somewhat inconsistent. Therefore, we discuss our understanding of these terms based on a
brief literature review.

Mobile Platforms
The term platform describes a technical architecture that allows compatible complements
to use it, e.g. an operating system Gawer, 2009. Alternative terms with similar meaning are
“technology platform” (Economides and Katsamakas, 2006) or “technology ecosystem”
(Adomavicius et al., 2007, Adomavicius et al., 2008b). A platform is usually centered around a
central technology or “keystone” (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). The platform leader (Gawer and
Cusumano, 2002) manages a group of cooperating firms (Mikkola and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006)
around that technology. The platforms leader enables other firms to build complementary
products and services (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2008).
Economically speaking, a platform is an intermediary between two or more sides of a
market (Armstrong, 2008, Rochet and Tirole, 2003). These “two-sided markets” are economic
networks that have two distinct user groups that provide each other with network benefits
(Economides and Katsamakas, 2006, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). Recent literature examines
platforms with respect to organization and leadership (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, Gawer and
Henderson, 2007), openness and proprietarity (Eisenmann, 2008, West, 2003, Economides and
Katsamakas, 2006), incentives to participation (Hagiu, 2006), competitions (Rochet and Tirole,
2003, Shapiro and Varian, 2003), or structures (Basole, 2009a, Basole, 2009b). We can consider
the operating system to be the core element of a mobile platform. Applications that use the
3
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application programming interfaces (APIs) of the mobile operating system can be considered to
be part of the mobile platform in a broader meaning as well. Hence, a mobile platform consists of
a mobile operating system and related mobile software applications.

Mobile Ecosystems
Hannan and Freeman were the first to borrow the term ecology from the natural science to
use it for organizational studies (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, Hannan and Freeman, 1989). The
analogy of ecology proved to be useful in understanding networks in an organizational context. A
business ecosystem consists of interdependent firms that form symbiotic relationships to create
and deliver integrated products. The increase in complexity of product development demands for
creating interorganizational relations (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Interorganizational relations can
improve performance and innovativeness of participating firms (Ahuja, 2000, Gulati et al., 2005,
Oliver, 1990). Firms engage in these networks to combine complementary knowledge and
capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Networks and alliances are particularly useful in the ICT
industry (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Management literature uses the concept of
business ecosystem to analyze strategic decisions, the “death” of networks (Nickerson and zur
Muehlen, 2006), and relationships between firms within (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) and across
(Harte et al., 2001) industries. Information systems (IS) researchers also use an organizational
ecosystem perspectives for forecasting Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) usage (Quaadgras,
2005), patterns of standardization setting (Nickerson and zur Muehlen, 2006), or paths of
influences between components, products, and infrastructure in technological transitions
(Adomavicius et al., 2007, Adomavicius et al., 2008a, Adomavicius et al., 2008b). The term
“value network” is sometimes used alternatively (Allee, 2000, Basole and Rouse, 2008,
Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995, Funk, 2009). To clarify the meaning of “platform” and
4
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“ecosystem” in relation to one another: ICT products are often a system of technologies that built
on a platform (Gawer and Henderson, 2007). The technology in the centre connects the
complementary technologies (Iansiti and Levien, 2004), and functions as a hub (Economides and
Katsamakas, 2006). Control over this central element (technology) is essential for the
orchestrator (firm) of the network (Nambisan and Sawhney, 2007). These networks, consisting of
both firms and their technologies, can be called ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Thus, an
“ecosystem” contains a “platform” as its technological core. A mobile ecosystem is a business
ecosystem in the specific context of mobile services.

Model of a Mobile Ecosystem
Mobile ecosystem are considered to consists of mobile network operators, mobile device
manufacturers, and mobile platform providers (Basole, 2009a, Basole, 2009b). We further divide
the mobile platform level into the mobile operating systems and mobile applications. These are
the four levels of our analysis (see Figure 1). On all four levels of the mobile ecosystem are
different markets, i.e. the ecosystem competes with other ecosystems.
On the mobile device manufacturer level we find the mobile device manufacturers that
produce and assemble the handset (also called terminal in the literature) on which a mobile
platform can run. A handset consists itself of different sub-elements again, e.g. the processor
chip. Yet, we leave these sub-elements out for simplicity of the model. Examples of handset
manufacturer include Apple, Nokia, and Samsung.

5
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Figure 1: Mobile Ecosystem Model

On the mobile operating system level we distinguish operating systems core and hardware
specifications. The hardware specifications of the mobile operating system can restrict the
operating system to a specific device or manufacturer. Open hardware specifications allow for an
OS to run on devices of different manufacturers, constituting an open system (Chau and Tam,
1997). The system core is the center of an operating system. The system core of an operating
system manages the running tasks, hardware driver, and provides general user interface (GUI)
and APIs. In General, operating systems can be distinguished between proprietary, hybrid, or
open source code systems. Examples for these three system types are the computer operating
systems Windows, Mac OS X (i.e. a proprietary system with some open source elements), and
Linux, respectively.
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On the mobile applications level we find the mobile applications (“apps”), functions,
services, and contents that consumers can use on a mobile platform. We subsume both client-side
applications (on the handset) and server-side applications (in the Internet) under the term
“application”. Examples of firms providing popular applications are Facebook, New York Times,
or Shazam. Specific software development kits (SDKs) are used as an application development
platform in order to create mobile applications. This is crucial for developers to distributed the
applications to end-consumers whether their business model is based on advertisement, selling
the application, or providing services that are charged for by use, i.e. pay-per-view contents
(Domingo-Ferrer and Martínez-Ballesté, 2002) or mobile payment services (Au and Kauffman,
2008, Dahlberg et al., 2008). Therefore, application distribution platforms can be considered an
important part of a mobile platform on applications level.
On the mobile network operator level a mobile phone operator provides the
communications network for the mobile ecosystem. Again, we note that the communications
network element of the mobile ecosystem consists of technological sub-elements. However, it is
usually brought into the mobile ecosystem in an integrated way by a major mobile network
operator. Therefore, we do not break this element further down. Examples of mobile network
operators include AT&T, NTT DoCoMo, and T-Mobile.
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OPENNESS AND OPEN RESOURCES

Types of Openness
“Open” phenomena in ICT industry illustrate the emergence of new modes of value
creation. One example is provided by the way that third-party applications are developed for the
i-mode and the iPhone ecosystems. Most of the third-party developers are not associated with
NTT DoCoMo or Apple. The definitions of the language necessary for developing applications
are openly – i.e. freely and publicly – available from NTT DoCoMo and Apple. i-mode uses
server-side services (“i-menu”) written in i-mode HyperText Markup Language (iHTML).
iHTML is a subset of the Internet standard markup language HTML. i-mode handset can provide
client-side applications (“i-appli”) written in DoCoMo Java (DoJa) as well. DoJa is a
programming language based on Java. Definitions, documentations, and tools for these languages
are openly available on NTT DoCoMo’s website (NTT DoCoMo, 2010c). Apple iPhone
applications are developed in the programming language Objective-C (or ObjC). Objective-C is
based on the popular multi-purpose programming language C. The resources necessary to
develop applications in Objective-C for the iPhone are XCode and the iPhone service
development kit (SDK). The iPhone SDK, XCode, and all related documents are openly available
on the Website of Apple (Apple, 2010a).
Another example of the use of openness is Darwin that is the system core of Mac OS X.
Mac OS (without the X) was a proprietary operating system until Mac OS 9. Mac OS was the
first operation system with a sophisticated Windows-based GUI. Until the mid-1990s Mac OS
was considered to be superior to Microsoft’s operating systems. However, Microsoft provided an
equivalent GUI and superior technical abilities with the releases of Windows NT and Windows
8
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95. In order to catch up again, Apple opened parts of the operating system code and adopted an
open source software (OSS) development model for the core of the operating system. Apple
developer and volunteering independent third-party developer jointly created a much more potent
system core, the UNIX-based Darwin. Combined with other components, such as the proprietary
“Aqua” GUI, Apple created the competitive Mac OS X (West, 2003). A variant of the same
Darwin kernel is used as the system core of iPhone OS.
We discern different forms of openness in these examples: Firstly, firms open certain
resources by providing public access (applications example). Secondly, firms give up property
rights on resources, effectively losing property rights control (Darwin example). Thirdly, firms
use open external resources to create own resources, i.e. NTT DoCoMo and Apple used nonproprietary languages to derive their respective languages variants. We can define: openness
describes something as freely and publicly available.

Open Resources and Open Value Creation
From a resource-based perspective, the entities that are open or closed in our examples are
“resources”. More specifically, “information resources”, knowledge that is economically relevant
and repeatedly applicable (Levitan, 1982). We consider both explicit (coded) information
resources and tacit know-how (Von Hippel, 1994). Value creation can be defined as the valuable
combination of complementary resources (Penrose, 1959). Information resources and know-how
that provide valuable resource combinations are not necessarily in possession of the firm or its
partners. Yet, the advent of ubiquitous Internet provides significantly reduced transaction costs
for information exchange (Benkler, 2002). Any outside party can be enabled to contribute
information resources to the value creation of the firm (if motivated to do so). The potential for
9
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finding a valuable combination of resources increases with the number of resources available (see
Figure 2). Therefore, opening access to resources allows for improved or even optimal allocation
(Arrow, 1962) of resources, i.e. the most valuable combinations of resources can be found.
However, the firm weakens its regime of appropriability, that is the ability of an inventor to profit
from its innovative product (Teece, 1986), by opening resources. There seems to be an optimal
level of openness (West, 2003), a trade-off between openness (allowing resource combinations)
and closedness (appropriability of the created value). In other words: a trade-off between value
creation and value appropriation.

Figure 2: Open Value Creation as Combinations of Knowledge

Literature on open phenomena describes the use of open resources as open innovation
(Chesbrough, 2003, Chesbrough et al., 2006), social and peer production (Benkler, 2002,
Benkler, 2006), or crowdsourcing (Howe, 2006, Howe, 2008, Leimeister et al., 2009). However,
literature has not yet satisfyingly connected these findings to existing economic and strategic
management theory (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). In the following section we discuss
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different resource-based theories with respect to their incorporation of open resources, i.e.
resources in free and public access.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Resource-based Theories
The Resource-based View (RBV) is a strategic management theory that is often used in IS
research (Aral and Weill, 2007, Hulland and Wade, 2004, Lim et al., 2009, Schneberger and
Wade, 2010). The RBV explains value creation, competitive advantages, and resulting rents of
firms through their possession of resources, i.e. valuable, rare, in-imitable, and non-substitutable
(VRIN) assets (Rumelt, 1984, Wernerfelt, 1984). Resource have to be protected, that is closed to
externals, to ensure competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). In the RBV, the heterogeneity of
resources between different firms leads to different abilities to create value efficiently (Barney,
1986b, Barney, 1991, Peteraf, 1993). Superior resources result in superior value creation, i.e. an
advantage in competition. This competitive advantage yields above average rents for the firm that
owns the resource. To achieve sustainable competitive advantage a firm needs valuable resources
that are inimitable and unsubstitutable (Barney, 1991, Hoopes et al., 2003). The traditional RBV
postulates a regime of tight appropriability (Teece, 1986) by preventing external access to
valuable resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, Barney, 1991, Peteraf and Barney, 2003) and
keeping internal control over the resource (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993, Ghemawat, 1986,
Peteraf and Barney, 2003). Resources can provide a competitive advantage only if the firm has
exclusive access to and control of it. This perspective suggests that converting a VRIN resource
to an open resource waives its potential to contribute to competitive advantage.
11
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The Relational View (RV) is based on, and complementary to, the RBV. The main
difference is that the RV focuses on relations between firms and their relational resources
(Duschek, 2004, Dyer and Singh, 1998). The RV explains competitive advantages as derived
from relations between firms and the integration of complementary resources. The RV takes the
additional value creation potential of relational resources and joint use of resources into account.
However, the RV focuses on formal long-term relations between firms and does not explain the
benefits of resources in open (free, public) access.
Dynamic Capabilities (DC) theory provides a dynamic perspective on the resources
controlled by a firm. In the DC, the resources base needs to be adapted to a changing
environment in order to continuously provide sustained competitive advantages. A firm needs
certain dynamic abilities to integrate internal and external resources in order to keep up with
technological progress and changing markets (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009, Lichtenthaler, 2009,
Rindova and Kotha, 2001, Teece et al., 1997, Zahra and George, 2002a, Zahra and George,
2002b). The DC framework constitutes three dynamic abilities: Firstly, the capability to learn
with organizational mechanisms. Secondly, the capability to integrate knowledge with absorptive
capacities (Lichtenthaler, 2009, Malhotra et al., 2005, Zahra and George, 2002a, Zahra and
Nielsen, 2002). Thirdly, the capability to reconfigure and transform a firm’s resource base (Amit
and Schoemaker, 1993). The DC can only partly explain the benefit of the use of open resources.
From a dynamic perspective firms like Apple can learn from the participation in OSS
development (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006, Von Krogh and Von Hippel, 2006). However, the DC
explains competitive advantages with the protected resource base of the firm (Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000), and has been applied in IS research mainly to explain inter-organizational
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knowledge exchange Malhotra et al., 2005. How to benefit from opening resources to the public
is not explicitly explained in the DC constructs.
The Knowledge-based View (KBV) of the firm (Grant, 1996a, Grant, 1996b, Spender,
1996, Spender, 1999) is an enhancement to the RBV that stresses the importance of knowledge
management (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In this view, knowledge, that is both tacit know-how
and explicit information resources (Grant, 1996b, Kogut and Zander, 1992, Nonaka, 1994,
Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009, Polanyi, 1966, Spender, 1996), is unequally distributed between
firms (Kogut and Zander, 1992, Liebeskind, 1996). The focus on knowledge is justified by the
fact that knowledge is the major contributor for value creation (Grant, 1996b, Hawken, 1983), a
factor for differentiation in the competition (Teece, 2000), and consequently a source of
competitive advantages (Spender, 1996). Since the KBV explains competitive advantage by the
means of heterogeneous distribution, immobility, and in-imitability of knowledge (Antonelli
1999; Kogut 2000; Kogut and Zander 1992; Spender 1994; Spender 1996) and demands
protection of it (Liebeskind, 1996) explanation of (and advice for) use of open resources are not
found in the KBV.
As summarized in Table 1, existing resource-based theories do not explicitly account for
open resources. Still, we consider the resource-based theories an appropriate stream to connect to
in order to understand why open resources are used and how they support business ecosystems.
The resource-based theories do provide constructs helpful to incorporate open resources into a
resource-based analysis. In particular, we use the concepts of “complementarity” and “specifity.”
“Complementary resources are not identical, yet they simultaneously ‘complement’ each
other” (Harrison et al., 2001, p. 679). In other words, complementarity means that the respective
resources are augmenting the use of one another. This augmentation leads e.g. to the relational
13
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rents of the RV as firms’ relations bring their complementary resources together. Research has
also highlighted that complementarity is an important aspect in analyzing the interactions
between firms’ abilities in the terms of the DC (Song et al., 2005).
Table 1: Resource-based Theories and Open Resources
Theory
Seminal contributions
Core idea

Explanation of open
resources
resources are the base for explains rents through
archiving competitive
exclusive resource
advantages, protected
base: does not explain
resources are the base for opening of resources
sustainability of these
and use of open
advantages
resources

Resourcebased view
(RBV)

Barney, 1986a, Barney, 1986b,
Barney, 1986c, Barney, 1988,
Barney, 1991, Dierickx and
Cool, 1989, Mahoney and
Pandian, 1992, Penrose, 1959,
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990,
Priem and Butler, 2001,
Wernerfelt, 1984
Relational
Duschek, 2004, Dyer and Singh, focus set on a network of explains the benefit of
view (RV)
1998
partners and their shared resources shared with
resources
partners, does not
explain the benefits of
open resources
Dynamic
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000,
resource development as learning effects
capabilities Helfat, 1997, Helfat and Peteraf, a dynamic process of
through use of open
(DC)
2003, Makadok, 2001, Priem and renewal and absorption resources are
Butler, 2001, Teece et al., 1997,
accounted for, other
Winter, 2003
benefits of open
resources are not
explained
Knowledge- Conner, 1991, Grant, 1996a,
heterogeneous knowledge importance of knowbased view Grant, 1996b, Kogut, 2000,
and capabilities are the how and information
(KBV)
Kogut and Zander, 1992,
major determinants of
resources stressed;
Spender, 1994, Spender, 1996
sustained competitive
protection instead of
advantages
openness demanded

“Specificity can be considered a 'relational' concept. An asset is not specific by itself but
in relation to 'something’” (Vicente-Lorente, 2001, p. 160). Resources are in most cases not
specific to a firm but specific, or “co-specialized”, to other resources (Lippman and Rumelt,
2003). Firms work with sets of co-specialized resources. Collaboration with other firms can
provide additional access to resources that are (or can be) co-specialized (Dyer, 1996). Specificity
14
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of resources can be unidirectional or bidirectional. In the unidirectional case, the specialized
(dependent) resource will lose value and the independent resource will keep its value if the
relation ends. In the bidirectional case both resources lose their value (they are mutually
depending). Specialized resources can support more efficient ways of value creation (Dyer, 1996,
Dyer and Singh, 1998). However, specializing a resource means to make it depended on another
resource. This bears the risk of losing relation-specific investment or having an unfavorable
power relation to the owner of the independent resource. Resources that are co-specialized are
also complementary, whereas resources that are complementary are not necessarily cospecialized. To sum up, we have to consider different types of relations between resources, i.e. to
analyze the valuable configuration of compound sets of resources, not individual resources.

Network Effect Theory
We will use constructs of the Network Effect Theory in order to understand the benefits
of open resources. A network effect describes that the use of a product (or standard, service) by
one person affects the value of that product for other users (Farrell and Saloner, 1986, Katz and
Shapiro, 1985). Network effects are caused by the fact that the utility of a net product (or net
good) is depending on the number of people using it. Mobile and other communications networks
are a classic example of a network with such effects. The more people use a communications
network, the more valuable the network becomes for its users. Sometimes the network effects are
described as “demand side economies of scale.” Economically speaking, a network effect is an
externality: The behavior of an individual (new user) unintentionally has an effect on others
(existing users) without a pricing mechanism. We speak of a positive externality if a new user
increases the value for others users, i.e. a positive network effect. We speak of a negative
externality if a new user decreases the value for other users, i.e. a negative network effect (as in
15
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the case of congested traffic). Network effects can be categorized in direct and indirect network
effects. A direct network effects indicates that the use of a product directly increases its utility for
other users. An indirect network effect indicates that the use of a product mediately increases the
product’s utility for others, e.g. by contributing to the development of more complementary
products or services (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). For example, handsets will usual get
cheaper with increased usage of mobile networks. Network effects can create a positive feedback
loop as the network becomes more valuable as more and more participants join (Arthur, 1996).
More participants in the networks increasing its value and more positive recommendations will
follow (“word of mouth”). In two-sided networked market – like operating systems platforms –
the real competition might actually not take place on the primary market (e.g. users), but on a
secondary market (e.g. software developers) (Economides and Katsamakas, 2006). See also
Figure 3.

Figure 3. Direct and Indirect Network Effects

Lock-in describes dependency of an individual or firm to a certain product. Lock-in can
result from network effects as they can provide increasing returns (Arthur, 1996). Switching costs
(time, money) quantify the costs of switching to another network. Lock-in and network effects
enable market leaders to establish „temporary monopolies“ (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Lock-in
and switching cost with respect to net product are affecting both the market for good itself and
the market for complementary products due to indirect network effects. This can be called market
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linkage or inter-market network effect (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). For example, the
acceptance of a certain credit card network increases the attractiveness to participate for both,
consumers and merchants. A product that is complementary to a specific technological platform
can be considered specialized (linked) to this platform (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, West, 2003,
West and Dedrick, 2000). Interfaces and standards have to be established in order to enable many
different parties to connect to a platform. Standards define the borders of the overall network of
compatible products that determines the costumers’ utility (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993).
The degree of openness of standards can be a strategic weapon in “standard wars” like Microsoft
Internet Explorer vs. Netscape Navigator or Betamax vs. Video Home System (VHS) (Shapiro
and Varian, 2003). Yet, establishing a widely accepted standard is a difficult task even without a
direct competitor (Garud et al., 2002), but nonetheless crucially important e.g. in the mobile
industry (Yoo et al., 2005).
To sum up, consumers will base their adoption decision regarding a net (platform,
ecosystem) product on the attractiveness of the core product as well as the attractiveness of the
complementary products (Teece, 1986). Network effects often link markets within an ecosystem.
Therefore, we analyze the markets corresponding to the levels in our mobile ecosystem model
jointly, not separately.

A RESOURCE-BASED FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF OPENNESS
Equipped with the constructs of the resource-based theory and the network effect theory
we can develop our framework. Central aims of a framework are give deeper understanding of a
problem and aid future research (Schwarz et al., 2007). Frameworks reduce a problem’s
complexity by providing concepts to analyze it (Porter, 1991). In this section, we construct a
17
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matrix framework to better understand and describe the different types of resources, including
open resources. Openness is easy to arrange for information resources like standards or source
code and difficult or impossible to arrange for physical resources. Therefore, we will mainly refer
to information resource in the following section. Information resources can be considered the
most important resources (Conner and Prahalad, 1996).

The “Openness” of Information Resources
We defined open resources as freely and publicly accessibly resources. Yet, access to a
resource is not the only characteristic to consider. Open source code is available and usable by
anybody, i.e. openly accessible and in no proprietary control (Darwin example). Anybody can use
the Darwin code, e.g. to fork off another operating system like OpenDarwin. However, the APIs,
SDKs, and other resource necessary to create mobile applications are still property of NTT
DoCoMo and Apple (applications example). In particular, the property rights owner could change
the terms of access to these resources. The resources are in open access, but in proprietary
control. Thus, we need to differentiate these two dimensions of “openness”. Our matrix
framework has the dimensions access to resource and control of resource.

Dimension 1: Access to Resources
The access dimension describes which parties have access to the resources. A resource in
(A.) exclusive access of a firm cannot be used by any third party. This can be achieved through
technical and legal protection mechanisms, such as intellectual property rights (Maskus, 2000).
Resources of this kind can exclusively be used by a single firm to add value and to achieve
competitive advantages in the sense of the traditional RBV (Barney, 1991). On the one hand,
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competitors cannot use such resources. Therefore, these are the resources directly leverageable
for competitive advantages. On the other hand, external ideas and knowledge are ignored. This
leads to limited number of resource combination possibilities, i.e. a low potential of value
creation. Such an access regime may prevent useful innovative combinations to be created or
developed to marketability (Chesbrough, 2003). Missing complementary resources may not be
acquired in the market place as markets for strategic resources are non-existent or imperfect
(Barney, 1986b, Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2007). (B.) Group access to
an information resource means access within a group of formal partners. Firms collectively built
a resource pool as a basis for exclusive cooperative value creating processes (Inkpen, 2000,
Khanna et al., 1998, Kogut and Zander, 1992). The rents resulting from group arrangements are
at the focal point of the RV (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Group access allows for more valuable
resource combinations. However, relational rents will have to be shared with a network of
partners. An information resource in (C.) open access – an open resource – is available for no, or
marginal, costs to the public (Lessig, 2002, Lessig, 2004, Pénin, 2007). This might be beneficial
in order to distribute a resource to a wide range of actors (Foray, 2004). Users, suppliers,
customers, research institutes, and competitors can contribute their different resources, knowhow, and ideas (Nooteboom, 2000). Open resource are available for a maximum of possible
combination with other resources, i.e. they provide higher value creation potential yet lower
value appropriation potential. The option of open access has only become a viable option with the
low transaction costs for information exchange and the ubiquity of the Internet (Benkler, 2006).

Dimension 2: Control of Resources
The control dimension represents the ability of the firm to control access to resources. A
firm has (D.) internal control over a resource, if it owns the corresponding property rights (or has
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similar proprietary authority). Internal control does not necessarily imply exclusive access.
Access may be granted to third parties, but the firm can reserves the right to withdraw the
resource. For example, Apple could legally change or close its APIs again with the next iPhone
OS version. Internal control means that the company can define the characteristics of access to
the resource. On the one hand, internal control reduces the risk of an external use of the resource
that negatively impacts the firm. Internal control of a firm’s resources creates a favorable
asymmetrical power relation between the firm and potential users of that resource. On the other
hand, such a power relation can discourage third-parties to use the resources, as there is limited
security of investments in complementary assets. In the case of (E.) shared control of resource, it
is a group (partners, consortium, or commons), not a single firm, that defines the characteristics
of access to that information resource. The members of the group jointly control the resource.
Shared control avoids dependencies and power asymmetries and might encourage firms to make
relation-specific investments. A firm might consider shifting information resource control to a
consortium in order to take advantage of this effect. Such a control regime can be put into
practice with e.g. licenses (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005, Osterloh and Rota, 2007). A
disadvantage of shared control in comparison to internal control is that partners might block
necessary changes to the resource or use it in ways that are not beneficial to the firm. (F.)
External control describes that an external body defines the characteristics of access of the
resource. This is the mirrored version of internal control, only it is this time an external party has
control of the resource.
These two dimensions create a nine field matrix (see Figure 4). We will discuss the nine
possible combinations of access and control regime.
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Figure 4: A Resource-based Framework for Analysis

Closed resources
(1.) Closed resources of the firm are proprietary controlled and are exclusively accessed
by the firm. Such resources allow the company to capture all the additional value creation that
can be attributed to these resources. This type of resource and its key role for value creation and
competitive advantages is discussed in the traditional RBV. Such resources are owned by the firm
and can be sold on markets (Ford and Ryan, 1981, Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2007). (2.)
Unilaterally used collective resources are in shared control but exclusively used by a single party.
Resources of this type are part of a formal cooperation between organizations, but are by legal
arrangement exclusively used by one party. (3.) Closed resources of externals are resources that
are not available to the firm. It might be possible to buy such resources in order to fill resource
deficits (Pisano, 1990). However, as mentioned earlier, markets for strategically relevant
resources may not exist or may be imperfect (Barney, 1986b, Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
Consequently, such resource might not be available at all for combinations with resources at the
firm’s disposal. Potentially valuable combinations of such resources with the firm’s resources are
not identified or leveraged.
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Shared resources
(4.) Shared resources of the firm are in the control of the firm, but are made available to
partners of collaborative arrangements. Yet, the firm does not give up control and property rights,
e.g. to guard itself from collaborators’ exploitation (Hamel et al., 1989) or to protect special
resources (Kale et al., 2000). (5.) Multilaterally used collective resources are accessed and
controlled by partners in order to collaboratively create value. The “relational resources” of the
RV usually fall into this category of resources. Such resources are developed over time and are
based on trust and cooperation. Any investment is depending on the reliable behavior of the
partners. Resulting rents are shared between partners. (6.) Shared resources of externals can be
used by the firm. However, they are controlled by another firm. The reasons of the other firm to
share access but to keep control are the same as for the resources in field 4.
Open resources
Our matrix framework explicitly considers “open resources” as well. This constitutes an
enhancement to the RBV. “Open” resources can be freely accessed by anyone (without individual
legal arrangements). However, the control regime can vary: (7.) Open resources of the firm are
still controlled by the firm, but access to it is granted to the public. Examples beside Apple and
NTT DoCoMo include Google Maps (third-parties can “mash up” Google Map data with other
data in order to create new Internet tools on the platform or elsewhere) and Facebook (it opened
its APIs to third-party developers). (8.) Common resources are not in control of any particular
firm or group. They are available to anybody to be used under equal restrictions. These resources
are the core foundation of democratically organized “commons-based peer production” (Benkler,
2006). The firm and its competitors can use these resources to equal conditions. Prominent cases
of value creation on basis of common resources include Linux, Wikipedia, and the Human
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Genome Project (the project in which the human genome code was cooperatively identified in the
years 1990 to 2003). (9.) Open resources of externals. These resources are openly accessible, but
externally controlled. Again, this is a mirrored version of field 7. It is depending on which firm’s
stance you take: From Apple’s perspective its SDKs constitute an “open resource of the firm”.
The same resource is an “open resource of an external” from an application developer
perspective.

ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE RESOURCE-BASED FRAMEWORK ON THE
ECOSYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we apply our resource-based framework in order to analyze the
orchestration of main resources on the different level of the NTT DoCoMo i-mode and Apple
iPhone ecosystems. The elements to be examined with the framework are the previously outlined
elements, i.e. the resources that correspond to them.

Mobile Device Manufacturer Level
NTT DoCoMo is not a mobile device manufacturer, even the “i”-branded handsets might
suggest otherwise. NTT DoCoMo partners with major mobile device manufacturer, namely
Fujitsu, Sony Ericsson, Mitsubishi, Sharp, Panasonic, and NEC. NTT DoCoMo’s offers i-mode
with its “mova” (2G) and “FOMA” (3G) networks. NTT DoCoMo designed many elements for imode handsets and required the partnering mobile handset manufacturers to adopt these elements.
The prominent element is the uniform i-mode button on all i-mode handset. The button enables
users to easily access the i-menu. NTT DoCoMo has managed to establish and maintain a
specific “look and feel” for i-mode handsets.
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Apple is the single designer and vendor of the iPhone handsets. The manufacturers of the
hardware components have conventional supplier contracts with Apple. Most notably, Samsung
supplies the central processing unit, a 32-bit Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) chip
(Zdziarski, 2008). The iPhone is physical assembled by the Taiwanese manufacturer Foxconn.

Mobile Operating System Level
When i-mode was introduced it relied on the native operating systems of the handset
manufacturers. In 1999, many Japanese 2G handsets used the open operating system ITRON
(Krikke, 2003, Tsuji et al., 2004). Since 2004 however, NTT DoCoMo provides the Mobile
Oriented Applications Platform (MOAP) to use with its FOMA (3G) network. MOAP is a crossmanufacturer software platform that software developers can build their applications on. MOAP
is both a middleware and a major part of an operating system. MOAP supports i-mode and adds
standardized menu structures to all handsets that can be used with NTT DoCoMo’s FOMA
network. MOAP(S) builds on a Symbian system core, while MOAP(L) builds on a Linux system
core, i.e. OSS (Tsuji et al., 2005, Yoshizawa et al., 2006). MOAP(S) is used on Fujitsu, Sony
Ericsson, Mitsubishi, and Sharp handsets. MOAP(L) used on Panasonic and NEC handsets.
MOAP supports multitasking (Yoshizawa et al., 2006). With MOAP, only hardware
specifications and device drivers are left to the different manufacturers.
The iPhone is equipped with the proprietary iPhone OS. The hardware specifications and
hardware interfaces of the iPhone OS are not available to third parties. iPhone OS is a closed
system (Hamilton, 2009). The access is closed and the control proprietary. Therefore, the iPhone
is the only hardware that can run iPhone OS and, vice versa, iPhone OS is the only operating
system for the iPhone models. The iPhone OS is based upon a variant of the same open source
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Darwin operating system core that can be found in Mac OS X. However, the iPhone OS system
core variant is closed for external access. Darwin is released under an Apple Public Source
License (APSL) that requires code created on its base to be published. Still, Apple, the grantor of
the APSL, does not have to fulfill its own licensing agreement. Extensions to OS X developed by
third-parties are published under a Berkeley Software Distribution License (BSDL) that allows
for both open and proprietary re-use. Consequently, Apple was able to fork off a proprietary
development branch and integrate these components to a closed mobile operating system, iPhone
OS.

Mobile Applications Level
There are two general types of applications for i-mode: i-mode supports server-based
“applications” (i.e. specialized websites providing mobile services) and client-based applications.
The websites in the i-menu have to be written in iHTML, a markup language based on HTML.
Client-side applications have to be written in DoJa, a variant of Sun Microsystems’ Java. Sun
Microsystems released the source code of Java as OSS in 2006 and 2007. However, NTT
DoCoMo had to obtain a license from Sun for the launch of i-appli in 2001. NTT DoCoMo
enhanced both iHTML and DoJa with proprietary elements so that it can be used only on i-mode
handsets. NTT DoCoMo used an open resource and brought it under proprietary control. The
application development platform for i-appli, the “i-appli Development tools”, can be
downloaded for free (NTT DoCoMo, 2010c). The official i-appli application distribution
platform is the corresponding section on the NTT DoCoMo website (NTT DoCoMo, 2010e). imode websites are accessible for users via the i-menu (i.e. it functions as the distribution platform
for the services). The i-menu pops up on pressing the i-mode button on the mobile handset. The
websites are listened in different categories of the i-menu and its sub-menus. The services are
25
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/10-78

Schlagwein et al. (2010) - Openness of Ecosystems: Resource-based Perspective
hosted on NTT DoCoMo’s central servers. These servers also handle the Internet-requests of iappli applications. NTT DoCoMo controls the inclusion of website/services in the i-menu. The
websites have to fulfill diverse criteria. NTT DoCoMo may not select services, even if they fulfill
all criteria. The selected websites are integrated in the billing structure of NTT DoCoMo. NTT
DoCoMo keeps a share of 9% of the revenues. However, i-mode users can access any iHTMLconform website directly, bypassing the i-menu. Therefore, many unofficial i-mode sites exist
(Funk, 2001). NTT DoCoMo developed MOAP in order to further encourage third-party
development of front-end applications (Yoshizawa et al., 2006).

Figure 5: Resource Configurations on Mobile Applications Level

“Apps” are heavily adopted by iPhone users, and generally considered to significantly
contribute to the attractiveness of the platform (Gralla, 2010). There are 185,000 applications
available in the App Store, which generated 4 billion downloads (as of mid-2010, Slivka, 2010).
There is a single application development platform to use with its “Cocoa” APIs: The Apple
iPhone SDK (Block, 2008, Hendrickson, 2008). Third-party developers are able to develop
applications for the iPhone with this SDK. The SDK includes XCode (a coding tool for
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Objective-C) and an iPhone simulator. There is no other SDK to create iPhone applications with.
Control stays fully with Apple, while access to the SDK is provided for everyone. There is only a
single official application distribution platform, the App Store. Apple requires a full registration
process for anyone who wants to distribute software through the App Store, including a
registration fee of 99.00 USD (Apple, 2010b). Developers are bound the conditions of the
Registered iPhone Developer Agreement (Apple, 2008). Applications are reviewed by Apple and
Apple has final authority to include them in the App Store (Hamilton, 2009). Apple keeps a 30 %
share of the revenue of application sold in the App Store. The App Store is integrated with
Apple’s iTunes billing structure.
It was helpful for NTT DoCoMo and Apple to use variants of existing languages like
HTML, Java, and C. The firms did not have to develop own resources, and created a market
linkage to draw on a large number of developers familiar with these languages. Takeshi Natsuno,
the strategist who designed the i-mode business model, has stressed that this factor was
instrumental for the success of i-mode (Natsuno, 2003, Natsuno and McCreery, 2003). In
contrast, mobile services basing their offerings on the new markup language Wireless Markup
Language (WML) were less successful. NTT DoCoMo and Apple added proprietary elements to
the language and requiring the use of their APIs and tools. The original languages are “common
resources” and “open resources of externals”. However, derived languages iHTML, DoJa,
Objective C, the APIs, development tools, and other resources for applications development are
“open resources of the firm”. The applications distribution platform can be used only by selected
partners. The terms of their access are in control of NTT DoCoMo and Apple. Thus, we consider
the App Store and the i-menu to be “shared resources of the firm”. The third-party applications
are “closed resource of externals”, i.e. their source-code is accessed and controlled only the
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respective firm. From a resource-based view, applications are dependent, specialized resources.
They cannot be used on other platforms (without significant additional work). Furthermore, they
cannot be distributed without agreement of the ecosystem orchestrator (NTT DoCoMo and
Apple) that controls the key (independent) resources, e.g. the application distribution platforms
(i-menu and App Store). The applications are “specific” to both the application programming
language and to the application distribution platform. Apple’s and NTT DoCoMo’s distribution
platforms are “co-specialized” to resources on other levels: the i-menu is only available in NTT
DoCoMo’s network, the App Store only accessible with an iPhone. In this way, NTT DoCoMo
and Apple established market linkages. The more applications are developed the more attractive
the network/handset becomes, and vice versa. As discussed above, this is a “two-sided market”
situation. Figure 5 shows the main relations between resources on applications level.
The availability of applications has often been discussed as crucial for mobile platform
success. Research suggests, that especially “killer applications” are responsible for the success of
i-mode (Barnes and Huff, 2003, Funk, 2001, Kivimaki and Fomin, 2001), and iPhone (West and
Mace, 2010). A killer application is an application that provides so much value for endconsumers that it massively boosts the adoption of the surrounding technological ecosystem.
Historic examples of killer applications include Tetris on the Nintendo Gameboy and Lotus 1-2-3
on IBM-PCs. Mobile emailing is widely considered to have supported the success of the i-mode
platform. West and Mace suggest that the ability to browse standard HTML websites (in
combination with the “multi-touch” navigation) is the killer application of the iPhone (West and
Mace, 2010). Additionally, the immense range of applications available might attract the “long
tail” (Anderson, 2004) of user with specific interest or needs.
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Mobile Network Operator Level
NTT DoCoMo is the only network operator offering i-mode (in Japan). NTT DoCoMo is
able provide exclusive network-side functions for its i-mode platform, e.g. the localization
service “i-area”. NTT DoCoMo is a subsidiary of the telephone company NTT. It was spun off
from the mother-company in 1991 to provide mobile network services. NTT was originally run
by the Japanese state. In 1985, NTT was transformed into a business enterprise. Still, the state of
Japan holds shares on NTT, there a special laws applying to NTT, and NTT has many ties with
state institutions. NTT DoCoMo used these ties to influence the 2G standard setting procedure in
Japan significantly. It was heavily involved with the Japanese Association for Radio Industry
Businesses (ARIB) for ratification of NTT DoCoMo’s Personal Digital Cellular (PDC) standard.
NTT DoCoMo had to reveal the details of the standard, to get it accepted. However, NTT
DoCoMo released technical information on PDC and its enhancements only with delay to nonpartners. Partnering firms, like Matsushita, Mitsubishi, NEC, and Fujitsu, were able to create
complementary handset earlier. These resulted in an almost 100% market share for PDC network
for the four partners. Additionally, it saved them considerable R&D investments. In return, the
manufacturers agreed to let NTT DoCoMo influence their handset design and to delay the
provision of new models for costumers competing mobile network (Funk, 2002). At the time imode was launched, NTT DoCoMo was leading the market with its PDC-based 2G mobile
network “mova”. NTT DoCoMo prevented customers of other networks to access i-mode, and imode user to use similar services of other providers. Thereby it created a market linkage between
it communications network and the new i-mode platform. Currently, 48 million of its 55,8 million
customers in Japan have an i-mode subscription (as of mid-2010, NTT DoCoMo, 2010b, NTT
DoCoMo, 2010d).
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Apple does not provide its own communication network. However, its contracts with
network providers are often exclusive and far reaching (depending on the country). Specifically,
iPhones are often “netlocked” to the network of the partnering provider (unofficial local
modification of the iPhone – “unlocking” – is possible). AT&T is the exclusive partner for the
US market, partners in other countries vary. Only the official partners can advertise the iPhone
and thereby profit from Apple’s highly valued brand. Some network-side services, e.g. the
“visual mailbox” may only available in these networks. Originally, Apple pushed for revenue
sharing models with its partners that would make it a “virtual” mobile network provider.
However, Apple had difficulties finding partners in Europe for its revenue sharing model, and
eventually dropped this model in favor for relying mainly on sales of the handset (Ziegler, 2008).
Since there is a market for handsets and for providers, we can consider the relation between the
iPhone platform and the communication network are rather complementary than co-specialized.
Figure 6 shows the relations between the selected resources on different levels of the two
ecosystems.
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Figure 6: Key Relations between Resources in the i-mode ecosystem

DISCUSSION
Our paper has implications for resource-based theories and it provides a tool to analyze
the use of “open” resources. Furthermore, it contributes to the understanding of mobile ecosystem
structures.
As for resource-based theory, the paper points out that resource-based views fail to
appropriately account for the role of open resources. The theories were developed before the
broad use of the Internet for open collaboration. The paper shows that in the case of mobile
ecosystem all three type of open resources – open resources of the firm, common resources, and
open resources of externals – where used by the ecosystem orchestrator.
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The analysis further suggests that the use of open resources in fact can create competitive
advantages if the value of the resource is depending on direct network effects or is impacting on
the value of information resources on other levels with indirect network effects (via market
linkages). NTT DoCoMo and Apple did not only enable additional value creation but also
benefitted from it, i.e. appropriated additional value. Indirect network effects triggered by the use
open resource leveraged closed resources through an appropriate layout of resource relations. To
sum up, resources have to be analyzed as a compound set of resources on different levels and
considering the different types relations between resources. The outlined framework provides a
generic tool to perform resource-base analysis that accounts different types of resources and
different types of relations.
Scholars have called to provide strategic advice for the handling of open resources
(Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007). As for strategic management advice, our analysis outlines
two ways in which a firm can benefit from open resources: (1.) the firm can overcome a
competitive advantage of competitors with open resources. (2.) the firm can leverage additional
value creation potential with open resources.
Firstly, a deficit in resources can lead to a disadvantage in the competition (Rumelt,
1984). A strategically important missing resource may not be bought in the market due to the
non-existence of such markets (Barney, 1986b, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). For the firm, a possible
solution is cooperation with partners that posses the required resources (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996). Yet, such cooperation offers may not be accepted for diverse reasons
(Ahuja, 2000, Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Alternatively, the use of open resources can make up
for resource deficits. In the 1990s, Apple was not able to compete with Microsoft on grounds of
internal development capacities anymore. However, by embracing OSS development – in this
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particular case by using already open resources and by transferring proprietary resources to open
resources – Apple was able to nullify Microsoft’s advantage and provide a competitive OS (as
discussed earlier).
Secondly, open resources can leverage the value of complementary proprietary resources
of firm. Products are created with compound sets of resources. These compound sets of resources
may include open information resources. However, the firm needs to retain complementary
proprietary resources for benefiting from open resources (Fosfuri et al., 2008). Firms can benefit
from opening resources e.g. enabling the creation of complementary products (Dahlander and
Magnusson, 2005, West and Gallagher, 2006). Part of the created value will have to be shared
with contributors. Still, it might be beneficial to have “a smaller piece of the bigger cake”, i.e.
rather focusing on the success of the overall ecosystem. In our examples, the third-party
applications are complementary products that were created with open resources. The applications
make the overall platform more attractive to consumers, thereby supporting network subscription
(NTT DoCoMo) and hardware sales (Apple) through market linkages under the presence of
network effects.
The application of the introduced resource-based framework to mobile ecosystems
provides the final “evaluation” step for constructive paper (Hevner et al., 2004, Peffers et al.,
2007) as well as it reveals interesting similarities between the ecosystems of i-mode and iPhone.
NTT DoCoMo and Apple both make resources openly accessible, increasing chances of adoption
and positive feedback. However, in both cases these open resources are co-specialized to
proprietary resources. Both firms intervened on all levels of the ecosystem to create market
linkages. Through these market linkages they were able to benefit from the positive feedback on
other market, i.e. levels of the mobile ecosystems (as in the Figures 5 and 6).
33
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/10-78

Schlagwein et al. (2010) - Openness of Ecosystems: Resource-based Perspective
We believe that one has to considering different approaches and views on ecosystems to
understand the many facets of them. With this paper, we believe to provide a novel resourcebased perspective on ecosystems and how resources need to be configured to benefit from
openness.
However, we are not claiming here, that openness is the only or major factor determining
the success of mobile ecosystems (in the case of encyclopedia openness might be the major
factor). The telecommunications industry is prone to disruptive technological changes (Bower
and Christensen, 1995, Christensen, 1999). Arguably, i-mode and iPhone both were a disruptive
change for mobile Internet usage. The former by providing mobile emailing and mobile services
experience for the first time (Funk, 2001); the latter by providing the “real” Internet page in an
accessible way (West and Mace, 2010) and providing a application platform that is ravenously
used by both, developers and end-consumers. The competing mobile ecosystems, namely the
ecosystems around Google/Android, Nokia/Symbian, RIM/Blackberry, and Microsoft/Windows
Mobile, will be measured by their ability to provide a equally attractive smart phone platform
(Suarez et al., 2009). The iPhone OS leads the global smart phone market by mobile Internet
usage (with a market share of 45.5 % as of March 2010, Admob, 2010). In terms of smart phone
sales by operating system, iPhone OS surpassed Windows Mobile in 2009 and ranked third
behind Blackberries OS, and Symbian OS (De La Vergne et al., 2010).
Interestingly, with the iPhone’s recent premier on the Japanese market, the two mobile
ecosystems of our analysis have in a way come to compete. However, i-mode seems to be quite
dated in technical terms in comparison to newer platforms. In 2008, Takeshi Natsuno (the central
figure in the i-mode development) stated: “I believe the iPhone is closer to the mobile phone of
the future, compared with the latest Japanese mobile phones” (Oomori, 2008). As predicted,
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Apple’s iPhone captured a market share of 72 % (as of April 2010) in the Japanese smart phone
market – shipped with a contract of NTT DoCoMo’s competitor SoftBank (Alpeyev and Eki,
2010). Yet, on April 26, 2010 NTT DoCoMo announced that it partners with Renesas, Fujitsu,
NEC, Panasonic, and Sharp in order to launch a new Linux and Symbian based mobile
application platform featuring HD video and 3D technologies in 2012 (NTT DoCoMo, 2010a).
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